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On December 8, 1941, less than 24 hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, a grocery store
in Oakland, California had a new sign in its window. The sign stated, in all capital letters, “I am
an American.” After hearing the news of the attack, the owner of the store, a graduate of the
University of California, had a painter make the sign. He, along with thousands of other Japanese
Americans—the majority citizens—would soon be forcibly removed to internment camps as
decreed and carried out by the United States government, specifically the Justice Department and
War Relocation Authority. 1 With just four words, the sign spoke volumes. It illustrated the
immediate shockwaves of Pearl Harbor and the clairvoyance of Japanese Americans, who feared
what was to come for them. As we now know today, they had a right to be concerned, and the
photo of a simple sign remains a reminder of how distrust, prejudice, and xenophobia would
come to shape the fate of Japanese Americans during the Second World War.
Less than two months after Pearl Harbor, on February 19, 1942, President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, which authorized the Secretary of War to
establish military areas and proceed with the internment of Japanese Americans, German
Americans, and Italian Americans. Beginning in March of 1942, a series of 108 exclusion orders
and the creation of military zones gave approximately 120,000 Japanese Americans no choice
but to pack up their belongings, abandon their homes, and arrive at one of the sixteen assembly
centers. From there, the government forcibly removed them to ten relocation centers, in places
scattered throughout the country, with most in and around California, and a few as far east as
Arkansas. As several historians have argued, a combination of wartime paranoia and racial

Dorothea Lange, “I Am an American,” Library of Congress Prints & Photographs Online Catalog.
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prejudice, are to blame for the internment of Japanese Americans.2 The question remains,
however, as to the relationship between the American public and the Presidential administration
in carrying out and approving of what would later be remembered as a dark moment in United
States history.
The Roosevelt administration’s domestic policy towards Japanese Americans was
molded by years of public contempt against the population, reinforced by a newfound fear of
Japan during the war. This led the country to become complacent in the loss of freedoms for
others if it meant overall security and preservation. The xenophobic mindset of the country
permeated every decision that the government made in regards to the Japanese American
population, and their civil liberties were taken in order to ease their own overwhelming anxiety
that the United States had an enemy from within. Although the removal and internment process
was carried out by the military and the heads of administration at the time were strong
proponents of getting rid of the Japanese, the camps could not have existed without the support
or even silent approval of the millions of Americans who were aware of what was happening.
The use of Japanese Americans as a scapegoat for the United States’ fears during World War II
is a clear example of how foreign relations can become fused with domestic ideology and can
become so powerful that they supersede basic constitutional and civil liberties.
Historians and scholars on the subject of the internment of Japanese Americans during
World War II have agreed on the root causes, but differ in assessing which factors contributed
the most to the internment. In earlier scholarship, sociologists heavily contested the conflation of

Brian Masaru Hayashi, Democratizing the Enemy: The Japanese American Internment, (Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 2004); Richard Reeves, Infamy: The Shocking Story of Japanese American Internment in World
War II, (New York, Henry Holt and Co., 2015); Greg Robinson, By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment
of Japanese Americans, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2001); Michi Nishiura Weglyn, Years of Infamy:
The Untold Story of America’s Concentration Camps, (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1976).
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and connection between “race,” “culture,” and “loyalty.”3 Michi Nishiura Weglyn’s Years of
Infamy was the first well-known comprehensive overview of the internment, specifically at Tule
Lake, and argued a hostage theory, in which the detainment of Japanese in the Western
Hemisphere to ensure humane treatment of American prisoners of war captured by Imperial
Japan.4 A more recent re-examination of the internment leads to more arguments towards the
importance of domestic factors such as intellectual trends, land and water rights, and economic
exploitation.5 In the end, foreign relations with Japan at the time of the war lit the match that fit
in perfectly with increasingly aggravated domestic opinion, and the public quickly shifted from
questioning to consent of the internment process, which they were fully aware of. The racial
prejudice both on the part of the government and reflected through mass media, mixed with the
overall paranoia of the public that pushed Japanese Americans into a corner, showing the
internment was less about the Japanese themselves and more about quelling the fear of the public
to show America’s power by dividing its own country apart.
The study of how foreign relations and pre-existing domestic opinion regarding Japanese
Americans reinforced each other in assuring their internment and exclusion from basic civil
rights has several applications for today. The removal and internment of Japanese Americans
stands as a stark reminder to America of what can happen even in the heart of a liberal,
democratic society, based on the very values that it was depriving its own people of. It is crucial
to be mindful of these misperceptions and the ways in which such an action was allowed,
particularly when thinking of the ways in which foreign policy guides government rhetoric and
the ways in which we think about the “other.” In America today there still remain marginalized

Hayashi, Democratizing the Enemy, 3.
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groups of minorities, and it is important for our society to remain politically conscious and able
to put aside prejudice and stereotypes in order to seek the truth, as this is what will prevent such
a dark period in American history from happening ever again. The case of the Japanese
Americans also shows how the targeting and alienation of a single minority can drive deeper
divisions between other minority groups, particularly with the Chinese American population at
the time. On the other hand, it shows what can happen when minority groups stand up for and
support each other, as seen through the eventual reparation acts towards Japanese Americans
affected by internment with the rise of the civil rights movement. By assessing the legal and civil
aspects of the internment, we can begin to understand how such an event could even take place
to begin with, and what it will take for America to ensure that it never happens again.
The reputation and image of Japanese Americans from a geographic, economic, and
social perspective created an easily alienated population and explains how they could be
perceived as disloyal by the public. Inheriting the racial prejudice that was at first given to the
Chinese immigrant population in the 19th century, there existed a growing anti-Asian sentiment
especially among the white population in California, where the highest concentration of Japanese
Americans lived at the turn of the 20th century. Though they were withdrawn and viewed as
outcasts in society, Japanese Americans were at the center of Orientalist stereotypes filling the
minds of the public, painting them as sly, cunning, and not to be trusted. The media at the time
sensationalized and solidified this sentiment, which can be seen in the title alone of an article
published by the San Francisco Chronicle in 1905: “The Japanese Invasion, the Problem of the
Hour.”6 As the Japanese became the new enemy, Chinese Americans even began wearing
buttons that said “I am a Chinese” in order to avoid being mistaken as Japanese and being

Linda L. Ivey and Kevin W. Kaatz, Citizen Internees: A Second Look at Race and Citizenship in Japanese
American Internment Camps, (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2017), 19.
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assaulted.7 These distinctions drew even deeper wedges between not only American society, but
between immigrant populations themselves, showing how negative stereotypes were being
perpetuated by the public on all sides.
The question of Japanese citizenship at the time is a reflection of the immigration policy
throughout the century leading up to the internment camps. Japanese immigration began in the
late 19th century, when the Kingdom of Hawaii received around 124,000 Japanese to work on
the sugar plantations. Due to the Naturalization Act of 1870, anyone of Asian descent was unable
to become a citizen, as it refers to only those of white or African descent, leaving Asian
immigrants with little desire to stay. 8 With Japan-U.S. relations dwindling, the Immigration Act
of 1924, also known as the Johnson-Reed Act, put an immediate end to all immigration from
Japan. Both Japan’s restrictive emigration policies and the United States’ immigration policies
led to a small population of only around 127,000 Japanese in America at the time of internment,
the majority residing in California and Hawaii.9
Although the Japanese worked primarily in the agricultural sector, with no citizenship
they were unable to own land, and were limited by a 1913 land law that prevented leases lasting
longer than three years. As a solution, the Issei, or first generation of Japanese immigrants in
America, would simply purchase the property in the name of their citizen children, or Nisei.10
Despite these legal restrictions that the Japanese had to maneuver around, their small minority
still managed to control almost one half of commercial crops in California. 11 This created a sense
of contempt toward the Japanese for taking jobs and monopolizing a large section of agriculture

Weglyn, Years of Infamy, 36.
Ivey and Kaatz, Citizen Internees, 19.
9 Ibid., 17.
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11 Ibid., 37.
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from specifically white farmers at the time, further muddying their perception in the public eye. 12
These farmers, especially in California, would later be one of the largest advocates for
internment, driven largely by self-interest.
Attempting to work and live in a country that was set up to discourage Asian immigrants
from staying, the Japanese were also subjected to constant monitoring and tests of loyalty.
Monitoring, secret reports, and surveys throughout the 1920s continually tested the faith of
Japanese Americans time and time again. Two of these reports, the Munson Report and the
Roberts Commission, show the extent of escalation and heightened pressures and potential
threats that the government saw. Through the comparison of these two, we can begin to
understand how these threats would ultimately manifest themselves in the preventative actions of
the Roosevelt administration in the months to come.
Roosevelt’s suspicions towards Japanese American loyalty led to the creation of the
Munson Report, submitted to the White House just two months prior to Pearl Harbor. In the fall
of 1941, Roosevelt commissioned John Franklin Carter, who was hired to build a network of
secret intelligence, to prepare a study on the “Japanese situation” on the West Coast and Hawaii.
Carter then chose Curtis B. Munson, a Midwestern Republican businessman, who met with local
FBI leaders and the leader of the raid on the Japanese Consulate in Los Angeles the previous
year. In the final report, submitted on November 7, 1941, Munson concluded that Japanese
Americans presented little to no threat, stating, “[The Nisei] are universally estimated from 90 to
98 percent loyal to the United States if the Japanese-educated element of the Kibei is excluded.
The Nisei are pathetically eager to show this loyalty.”13 Munson stated that he believed only

Hayashi, Democratizing the Enemy, 92.
Curtis B. Munson, “The Munson Report,” reprinted in Digital History, ed. Steven Mintz and Sara McNeil,
Accessed December 2, 2019.
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imported agents would carry out sabotage and espionage. He pointed out that the Kibei, who
received their early education in Japan, were the most dangerous element, but the Issei, or first
generation, was not a large threat, as they had “made this their home” and had “brought up
children here.”14 The Sansei, or third generation, could be largely disregarded as they were too
young.15 His report was summarized into five passages that Carter compiled into a summary to
send to the President. The first of these five was, “There are still Japanese in the United States
who will tie dynamite around their waist and make a human bomb out of themselves… but today
there are few.”16 No doubt the fear of even just a few Japanese willing to go to such lengths
would scare Roosevelt, who already felt pressure both abroad and by his own administration to
act.
Though the government largely ignored Munson’s claims that the Japanese where
overwhelmingly loyal and posed no threat to the security of U.S. interests, it is also necessary to
point out that the recommendations for future action towards Japanese Americans were to be
reassured by the President or Vice President to reinforce a negative public opinion of them.
While the military governor in Hawaii put an end to fifth-column rumors while ensuring equal
treatment to aliens and citizens who remained loyal, Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, would
report to the Tolan Committee in March of 1942 that the Japanese Americans had used “radio
sets, successfully preventing the commander in chief from determining in what direction the
attackers had withdrawn…” in the Pearl Harbor attacks.17 This diversion of blame for the attacks
and suppression of the Munson Report led more citizens to think of all Japanese as untrustworthy
and suspicious. Meanwhile, the Japanese were quick to notice the lack of support, as one woman,

Ibid.
Ibid.
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Kiyo Sato, recalls the negative rhetoric by government officials in her memoir, such as Attorney
General Earl Warren saying, “The fact that nothing has happened means that they are planning
something,” and General John DeWitt repeatedly quoted as saying, “Once a Jap, always a Jap.”18
The Munson Report would soon come to be overshadowed by the Roberts Commission,
which quickly earned national attention and played a large role in shaping public opinion at the
time. The Commission, carried out by Supreme Court Justice Owen Josephus Roberts, was
presidentially appointed to investigate the Pearl Harbor attacks. The report was released on
January 23, 1942, and consisted of ambiguous conclusions and vague references to Japanese
Americans’ involvement in espionage in Hawaii before Pearl Harbor.19 The report was released
to the public the next day and appeared in the headlines of newspapers across the country. The
government made no differentiation between the spies who were hired or brought from Japan
and the resident Issei and Nisei populations of Japanese Americans. Media along the west coast,
however, was the most extreme. The Los Angeles Times, which had supported the Nisei as good
Americans a week earlier, not called for the “immediate relocation of both aliens and American
citizens.”20 This shows a clear shift in the narrative, from one of understanding and support for
the Japanese Americans who had lived in America their whole lives, to one of fear for all
Japanese, regardless of residential status in the country.
As public opinion steadily increased towards alienating the Japanese and blurring the
lines between foreign spy and domestic resident, pop culture also reflected a revitalized hatred in
the face of the enemy. An example of this can be seen in an issue of LIFE Magazine at the end of
December 1941, immediately following Pearl Harbor. The article, in between an ad for Ten High

Kiyo Sato, A Japanese-American Family’s Quest for the American Dream, (New York, Soho, 2007), 92.
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bourbon and a Christmas letter from Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, is dedicated to helping the
average American distinguish the physical characteristics of the “friendly Chinese” from that of
the “enemy alien Japs.”21 Not only did the article discuss the difference in height and proportions
of bodies, but it also included a side-by-side comparison of General Hideki Tojo and a Chinese
public servant, Ong Wen-hao, complete with notes on facial features.22 The article, which was
biased and clearly geared towards targeting the Japanese enemy, showed a complete lack of
consideration for actual loyalty or citizenship, and this further illustrates the ways in which
Japanese were painted as the enemy on the terms of race alone. While public opinion was largely
misguided and misinformed, it is clear that prejudice dominated the domestic reaction to the war.
A recurring theme of the scholarly discussion on Japanese internment is the failure of
political leadership to give in to paranoia and fear. By Order of the President, written by Greg
Robinson, gives a thorough examination of the President through his own letters and internal
documents in order to understand the reasons behind his decision.23 General John DeWitt was
one of the most vocal proponents of the immediate removal of the Japanese following Pearl
Harbor. In a Conference at the Office of the Commanding General in January of 1942, DeWitt
remarked, “I have no confidence in [Japanese] loyalty whatsoever… We have got to be able to
enter their homes and premises, search and seize immediately without waiting for normal
processes of the law.”24 Mounting pressure on Roosevelt from all sides, both abroad and
domestically, led him to make what was, at the time, a “pragmatic decision, made by a practical-

“How to tell Japs from the Chinese: Angry Citizens Victimize Allies with Emotional Outburst at Enemy,” LIFE
Magazine 11, no. 25, December 22, 1941, 81.
22 Ibid., 82.
23 Robinson, By Order of the President.
24 U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Exhibit L: copy of ‘Conference with General DeWitt’ at
Office of Commanding General, Headquarters Western Defense Command and Fourth Army; January 4, 1942,
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minded President in a time of crisis.”25 Colonel Karl Bendetsen and Secretary of War Henry
Stimson were also pro-internment, believing the Issei and Nisei would hardly be able to
“‘withstand the ties of race.’”26 On the other hand, Francis Biddle, Roosevelt’s Attorney General,
was one of the strongest opponents of removal, and strongly criticized journalists at the time as
“‘acting with dangerous irresponsibility,’” and wrote later in his postwar memoirs that
“American citizens of Japanese origin were not even handles like aliens of the other enemy
nationalities… but as untouchables.’”27 As an old friend of the President, Biddle still remained
outspoken, and his opinions fell to the background in the decision-making of the Roosevelt
administration.
The use of language by the government in their removal orders shows how they framed
the expulsion of Japanese Americans in ambiguous and seemingly harmless terms. Executive
Order 9066, announced by the President on February 19, 1942, authorized the Secretary of War
to create military zones. The language in the document itself, however, is extremely ambiguous,
and Roosevelt leaves room for interpretation, as when he states that the Secretary of War may
“prescribe area in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander
may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded.” 28 Roosevelt gave the Secretary
of War, Henry L. Stimson, unlimited control in carrying out the details, with no guidelines or
rules about who could then be excluded. Following Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34,
announcements were posted calling for the immediate removal of all persons of Japanese
descent. The posting calmly announced that by a certain date, “All Japanese persons, both alien

Ibid., 123.
Weglyn, Years of Infamy, 43.
27 Weglyn, Years of Infamy, 68.
28 “Transcript of Executive Order 9066: Resulting in the Relocation of Japanese (1942),” Franklin D. Roosevelt,
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and non-alien, will be evacuated from the above designated area.” 29 This phrase alone shows the
careful wording of the Western Defense Command in phrasing the forced removal. Citizens in
this case are merely referred to as “non-aliens,” and the idea of being “evacuated” from an area
gives off the connotation that there is something that they need to escape, when in reality, the
only threat to the Japanese Americans was by those carrying out the removal.
Japanese Americans were largely cooperative during the removal process, which only
aided the government in saying that the removal process was a necessary one. As Kiyo Sato’s
family boarded the train at the Poston Internment Camp, she recalled women greeting each other
using the phrase “Shikataga nai ne.”30 This phrase, roughly translating to “it can’t be helped,”
was the general reaction by the Issei and some Nisei when being detained. While this at first
seems like the Japanese were complacent in their own exclusion, they only acted in such a way
that was respectable, as they still had a commitment to the United States, and were merely
confused and hurt as to what they were being forced to do. They resisted the process by resisting
victimization, and endured the hardships of internment in the face of justice being denied.
Many Japanese Americans sent letters to political officials to show their loyalty to
American values and argue for their freedom as citizens. Lawrence T. Kagawa, a Japanese
American dual citizen, wrote a letter to a delegate in response to his family being detained in
Hawaii and sent to Camp McCoy in Wisconsin. His letter, dated March 12, 1942, stressed the
American Constitutional values while also discussing his personal character and patriotism. 31 He
wrote, “the Constitution gave me the absolute sacred right as American citizen upon my birth.”32

“To All Persons of Japanese Ancestry.” Western Defense Command and Fourth Army Wartime Civil Control
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The question of constitutionality would be one that many who opposed the internment would use
in their arguments, but would be answered by the administration’s executive decisions. Kagawa
also writes in support of the war effort, claiming that he was “praying every day for my freedom
so that [he’ll] be able to serve the country properly” by fighting. 33 This expression of dedication
to the American cause also underscores the harsh irony in detained citizens wanting to go abroad
and defend the very ideals they were not given, as seen with the thousands of Japanese
Americans already in the army. 34 Hawaii also did not have representation in Congress, and the
non-voting delegate that Kagawa wrote to most likely did not act on the letter.35
Meanwhile, the War Relocation Authority justified their actions to the American public
through propaganda. The Office of War Information produced a newsreel titled “Japanese
Relocation” was produced by the Office of War Information in 1942.36 Milton Eisenhower, the
younger brother of Dwight D. Eisenhower and original director of the WRA, directed the
newsreel, and he narrated the reasons for removal and relocation of the Japanese Americans. In
the newsreel portrayal, the removal process as shown in the newsreel went smoothly, and clips of
government agencies helping the Japanese lease their businesses or find tenants with “Christian
decency” for their farms reassured the average American watching that there was nothing wrong.
The image of cooperation of the Japanese with the their “sacrifice” for the loyal American
citizens was to protect everyone until the disloyal have left. 37 Films like these contributed to the
overall sense that the process was being undertaken in a civil, democratic manner, and that the
Japanese wanted to go in order to help their country.

Ibid., 73.
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It is important to note that some American citizens also opposed internment and would
come to question the implications of such an act in the face of an American democracy. In one
letter from Marion R. Weddell to President Roosevelt at the end of 1943, she wrote, “‘If we
cannot all stand before the law in equal liberty and freedom—to live our lives, regardless of race,
creed or color— then What Price Democracy?’”38 Many wondered how such a process could
happen in their own country, questioning the integrity of the democracy they lived in. Truman B.
Douglass, a minister from Missouri, wrote a pamphlet questioning the ideology of the
government, titled “70,000 American Refugees: Made in U.S.A.”39 Douglass wrote about the
injustices being committed and the dismal camp conditions, and further expressed the sentiment
that Americans were being affected, regardless of what their race or ethnicity.
German and Italian American citizens and aliens were not targeted as directly as Japanese
Americans at the time, further demonstrating the racial prejudice that existed. In a letter from
President Roosevelt to Governor Herbert H. Lehman in June of 1943, he made a point to reassure
him that “‘no collective evacuation of German and Italian aliens [was] contemplated at the
time.’”40 The persecution faced by German Americans at the during and after World War I had
left the German alien community in America to have to defend themselves throughout, and as
Timothy J. Holian explains in his book, The German-Americans and World War II, mass media
played an influential role in the public perception of the German community, and, similarly to
the Japanese, little was done to distinguish loyal German Americans and aliens from pro-Nazi

Weglyn, Years of Infamy, 103.
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elements.41 In total, 11,000 ethnic Germans and less than 2,000 ethnic Italians were detained by
the U.S., and there were no mass removals ordered for either.42
Some Japanese Americans resisted the evacuations any way that they could, raising
questions of the constitutionality that would define the government’s stance on the issue.
Korematsu v. United States is one of four challenges to the curfews and evacuations that reached
the Supreme Court. Fred Korematsu, who lost his job after Pearl Harbor, refused to report to the
Tanforan Assembly Center on May 9, 1942. Korematsu went as far as changing his facial
appearance through plastic surgery, change his name, and finding a new job in San Francisco to
change his identity. Arrested on May 30, Korematsu brought his case to challenge the
constitutionality of the evacuations with the help of the ACLU. Judge Adolphus rejected the
argument that Korematsu was being denied due process, and Korematsu was later convicted in
federal court for violating Executive Order 9066. 43 Thie legalized the process as an exercise of
war power, and as Weglyn wrote, “the military-necessity rationale... was firmly vindicated…
justifying the ‘exclusion of an entire group’ because of the ‘finding of the military authorities
that it was impossible to bring about an immediate segregation of the disloyal from the loyal.’” 44
The stance of the Supreme Court in the case of Korematsu shows how the government justified
the mass evacuation under war suspicions and nothing else.
Despite facing the rampant racist views and continuous exclusive legislation, the majority
of Japanese Americans surprisingly stayed extremely loyal while they were in the camps. For the
most part, Japanese Americans still believed in and were faithful to Roosevelt. Many believed
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that he was ill-advised or misinformed in his decision to intern them, and that he was on their
side. Several wrote to him as well, expressing their support of the war effort and ask him to
improve conditions in the camps. 45 Because of this, the death of Roosevelt came heavily, and the
mourners included Japanese Americans themselves, who were deeply saddened by the news. The
Japanese American Citizen League sent telegrams to Washington and wrote in their newspaper,
“His humanitarianism knew no political of geographical boundaries, no limitations fixed by race
or color or creed.”46 Inside of the camps, special memorial services were held, and 3,000 people
attended the service at Manzanar, where Catholic, Protestant, and Buddhist clergymen held a
joint service.47
Reintegration and the lifting of the Exclusion Orders would give Japanese Americans
hope of starting their lives in society again, but this would only be the start of a long journey to
find a home in a country that had displaced them. Responding to a letter inquiring about the
atmosphere upon returning home, J. Elmer Moorish, a banker who kept up with the finances of
Japanese who were expelled from Redwood City, California, wrote back that “it would be best to
delay returning a few months until the general public got used to the idea of the return.”48 When
Imperial Japan surrendered in 1945, there remained around 55,000 evacuees left in the camps. At
Tule Lake, the last internees were given $25 and a train ticket back to where they had been
picked up.49 Many Japanese lost their homes, businesses and farms to new owners who had taken
over their property, leaving them to have to begin again with nothing. There were also many
cases of violence, and anti-Japanese rallies were rampant along the east coast. One anti-Japanese,
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Christian organization, the Home Front Commandoes, distributed brochures titled “SLAP THE
JAP: No Jap Is Fit to Associate with Human Beings.”50 The rampant backlash from their release
led many to move to other parts of the country rather than going back to the Pacific Coast.
After the end of internment, a combination of the Nisei wishing to return to normalcy and
the old age of the Issei led to the voice of the Japanese American community falling silent. Many
Japanese did not want to talk about the events that had unfolded, and chose to appreciate the new
life they had been given. However, the rise of the Civil Rights Movement led to a reawakening
and promotion of civil liberties for the African American community, and no other group could
relate more to such a cause than Japanese Americans. In 1976, President Gerald Ford signed
Proclamation 4417, terminating the Executive Order 9066, and stating, “‘We now know what we
should have known then, not only that evacuation was wrong, but Japanese Americans were and
are loyal citizens.’”51 Despite the additional Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which passed and made
individual redress payments to Japanese Americans who were detained and relocated, no amount
of money or government recognition can reverse the emotional damage already done.52
The week before Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, Kiyo Sato, a young girl at the
time, had just won an essay, titled “What America Means to Me.” 53 The internment of Japanese
Americans raises larger questions about what Constitutional rights are worth in the face of
executive authority and wartime hysteria. The power of media and the communication between
the public and the government played a huge role in securing the expulsion and detainment of
more than 120,000 Japanese Americans, and the use of misconstrued, sensational information as
a way of fitting into a certain type of narrative led to a twisted understanding of the internment
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camps. While Japanese resisted playing the role of the victim, their sufferings should not go
unnoticed, as they originally did. Sometimes regarded as a footnote in the pages of history
regarding World War II, the memory of the camps and their lessons must not be forgotten. In a
world where fear and distrust of the “other” are still prevalent, the effects of events in the 21st
century such as 9/11 or the “Build the Wall” sentiment on the American public is extremely
important, and determines if we will uphold American Constitutional values of freedom and
equality in the face of stereotypes and discrimination. The Japanese internment remains a strong
reminder for those who might forget that silence is deafening, and that injustice can happen
anywhere.
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Research Narrative

I wrote this research paper over the course of the Fall 2019 semester in my U.S. Foreign
Relations class with Dr. Lauren Turek. We were asked to come up with a research proposal that
dealt with any aspect of U.S. Foreign Relations that particularly interested us. In the class, one of
our readings for World War 2 was a letter from Lawrence T. Kagawa, a Japanese American who
was interned in Wisconsin. In the letter, which I later used in my research paper, Kagawa
showed his steadfast loyalty for America, but also argued for his freedom using the Constitution
for support. The letter piqued my interest personally and academically. My grandparents and
relatives were detained at Tule Lake throughout the war, and I have always been interested in
learning more about it. This research paper gave me the opportunity to study the internment
period in an academic setting and learn about the scholarship on the subject. I also wanted to
focus on how foreign relations and domestic policy influence and directly relate to each other,
and show how something as fundamental and basic as constitutional rights as a citizen could be
taken away and supported by a public overcome with fear and anxieties. After doing some initial
research, I decided to approach the subject through the lens of a combination of government war
hysteria and public opinion, as I argue that it was a mixture of the two that resulted in the
rejection of American constitutional values of some for the sake of national security for all. I also
found it interesting that although the internment of Japanese Americans happened almost 80
years ago, the types of rhetoric and stereotyping are recurring and ever-present in our current
events today, and shows that the study of this dark period in American history has lessons that
are extremely relevant today.
In my research, I used a various combination of sources, including government
documents, letters, first-hand memoirs, and second-hand sources from the Coates Library to give
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me an idea of the pre-existing scholarship and how I could contribute to it. I used the National
Archives to read transcripts of conferences that took place between the War Relocation
Authority and top officials, as well as government-issued documents such as the famous
Executive Order 9066 that formally began the process of relocating Japanese Americans. I also
used the Smithsonian Archives to find objects and photos such as a pamphlet made in opposition
of the camps. I tried to use sources that would paint a broad and overarching picture of the
internment from all angles. Through my research, I also found that the power of media and pop
culture at the time revealed powerful messages and the racist, stereotypical mindsets that were
generally accepted at the time, such as in the LIFE magazine article comparing Chinese features
to Japanese features. Using the primary sources as context, I also read secondary sources that not
only constructed a timeline about the way the internment was dealt with, but showed different
scholarly approaches to the subject, ranging from research on historical figures such as President
Roosevelt to see into the mindset, or from an economic or sociological approach. Overall, I
aimed to connect the messages and lessons learned from the internment to the way we handle
messages from the government about current issues such as terrorism and immigration in an age
of “false news.” I hope that through my research, the case of the internment of Japanese
Americans can be used as an example of what can happen anywhere when any minority group
gets silenced and democracy is revoked.

